We study strategic transmission of rival information among individuals who share altruistic relations. Information sharing naturally takes the form of word-of-mouth communication. Yet, the social forces that promote communication can also undermine it. Indeed, larger social networks may share less information, and better-connected individuals may get less information. Therefore, when forming networks, individuals strategically cluster into groups that share information and trust by limiting other connections as a commitment to secrecy.
caught in a con ‡ict of loyalties, may feel compelled to pass on the information.
Since informing the friend may expose the information to social forces outside of one's control, one may withhold the information after all -albeit not for lack of sympathy but out of secrecy. Thus, while sympathy is a prerequisite for information sharing, it is not su¢ cient without trust that the shared information does not leak too far. Interestingly, sympathy derives from the (direct) friendship between two individuals, whereas trust depends on the overall structure of social relations in which their friendship is embedded.
For example, consider an unemployed person, 0, who knows about a company that searches for a couple of new employees. Even though sharing this information lowers each applicant's chances of being hired, 0 is inclined to tell an unemployed friend, 1, about this opportunity. However, whether 0 lets 1 in on this opportunity depends also on whether 1 would in turn leak the information to other job hunters (close to 1 but not to 0). Thus, it matters what social structure surrounds 0 and 1's friendship. (This motivating example is presented more formally in Section 2.)
There is irony in the logic that social ties can undermine (actual) information sharing precisely because they facilitate (counterfactual) information sharing. Indeed, the implications of this logic turn the conventional wisdom on its head; more social ties can lead to less information sharing, and better-connected individuals may receive less information. Furthermore, the fundamental need for trust imposes endogenous constraints on network formation, which are distinct from exogenous costs of forming social ties. We show that individuals cluster around information providers in circles of trust, shying away from forming ties outside of their circle.
Such self-imposed limits to "networking" are a means to build trust by avoiding
The endogenous network structures in our paper are similar to those derived by Galeotti and Goyal (2010) , who study strategic network formation by individuals that can either produce costly information or receive information by forming costly links to informed individuals. Their analysis relies on non-rival information (which makes communication non-strategic), and network formations are driven by costsaving and free-riding considerations. In our analysis, network structures manifest a trade-o¤ between access and secrecy, which arises from strategic communication issues. In fact, we derive these structures in settings without any exogenous costs (of information acquisition or link formation).
Finally, it is instructive to compare the nature of information in our model to the notion of public goods in networks (Bramoulle and Kranton, 2007) . Public goods in networks cannot be excluded along social links; that is, they spill over to neighbors. By contrast, we consider information that is excludable. Yet, while an individual can exclude others, it cannot perfectly select whom to exclude; once information is released to some, it may also reach those whom the individual would like to have excluded. In this sense, exclusion is imperfect.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 highlights the core insight through a simple example, which is then generalized in Section 3. Section 4 explores the implications of our results for network formation and information ‡ow. Section 5 discusses a possible link between intellectual property rights and social network formation. Section 6 presents our concluding remarks, and mathematical proofs are in the Appendix.
Motivating example
Consider an individual who has a piece of information (henceforth agent 0). Anyone that owns the information enjoys private value (n) = 1= (5 + n), where n is the number of agents who own the information. Note that 0 (n) < 0, that is, sharing the information dilutes its value. Suppose there is one other individual, agent 1. The two agents are friends in the sense that they each internalize a share = 1=5 of each other's payo¤. Agent 0 shares its information with agent 1 if and
The inequality re ‡ects agent 0's costs and bene…ts from sharing the information.
Agent 0 internalizes part of agent 1's gains from the information (left-hand side), but conversely relinquishes some of its own gains (right-hand side). In our example, the inequality becomes 1=35 1=42. So, the information is shared.
Let us add another individual, agent 2, who is a friend of agent 1, but only indirectly a friend of agent 0 (a friend of a friend). Assume that indirect friends internalize only a share 2 = 1=25 of each other's payo¤. Given the information, agent 1 would share it with agent 2 if (1 + 2 ) (3) (1 + ) (2), or
Similar to above, on one hand, agent 1 internalizes some of agent 2's gain when passing on the information; on the other hand, it su¤ers from the loss of private information value both by itself and by its already informed friend, agent 0. In our example, the inequality becomes 1=40 3=140. Thus, agent 1 would pass on the information. By backward induction, agent 0 anticipates that the information, if communicated to agent 1, would travel to agent 2. Hence, agent 0 shares the
In our example, this becomes 3=100 1=24, which is not true. Thus, the information is not shared at all. Interestingly, we know that agent 0 would want agent 1
to have the information. The reason it does not share the information with agent 1 is that agent 1 would feel compelled to give it to agent 2. Now let us add one more individual, agent 3, who is a friend of agent 2, but only indirectly a friend of agent 1 (a friend of a friend) and agent 0 (a friend of a friend of a friend). Again, we use backward induction: Agent 2 would transmit the information to agent 3 if 3 Word of mouth, secrecy, and trust
Consider a chain of N friends, indexed i 2 f0; 1; : : :g. Agent 0 is endowed with a piece of hard information that it can share. Let I denote the set of agents that have the information. An individual agent's payo¤ from owning the information, (n), depends on the total number of agents that own it, n = jIj.
Assumption 1 (A1) ( ) satis…es the following properties:
In words, an agent's payo¤ from owning the information decreases, and vanishes in the limit, as the number of informed agents grows. The third property ensures that the collective payo¤ of all informed agents increases with the number of informed agents. It is not necessary for our results, but implies that sharing the information (with as many agents as possible) is socially optimal.
We model the strength of friendship between two arbitrary agents, i and i 0 , in reduced form as a function of the distance between them, (ji 0 ij).
Assumption 2 (A2) ( ) satis…es the following properties:
In words, the friendship between two agents becomes weaker, and vanishes in the limit, as the distance between them grows. The third property says that an agent never cares in…nitely much about all of its friends. The utility of agent i can be written as
For use below, we de…ne
so that
Recall that (n) denotes the information payo¤ to an individual informed agent. Assumption 3 (A3)
for all i and n.
This assumption accentuates the "paradox"that we want to illustrate: Social ties provides strong incentives to share information but can, by the same token, become an impediment to information sharing.
In what follows, we analyze how far the information travels through the chain of friends. Communication choices are sequential and strategic: An agent chooses whether to share information only upon receiving it, while considering the choices of those who, as a result, would become informed. A subtle issue is that agents (must) form conjectures about which agents are already informed. Hence, we look for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (henceforth, equilibria).
Pattern of communication Our …rst step is to show that we can restrict attention to communication between direct friends without loss of generality. We start by considering whom among the uninformed an informed agent most wants to share the information with.
Lemma 1 Any agent prefers to transmit information to a closer friend.
The proof of this result is as straightforward as the intuition behind it. Since gains from transmitting information arise from sympathy towards the receivers, agents prefer to share information with their closest friends. A direct implication of Lemma 1 is that the members of I always forms an uninterrupted chain, with no uninformed agents in-between. That is, I = f0; 1; : : : ; n 1g. This allows us to rewrite the community factor in (5), with a slight abuse of notation, as
It also pins down how the community factor varies across informed agents.
Lemma 2 (n 1; n) (i; n) for all i < n 1.
That is, among the informed agents, it is the agent furthest away from agent 0 -agent n 1 -who has the smallest community factor. As such, agent n 1 is the informed agent who least internalizes the loss incurred by the already informed agents when the information is transmitted further. We can now determine from whom an uninformed agent is most likely to receive information.
Lemma 3 The incentive to transmit information to some uninformed agent i is strongest for its closest informed friend.
This implies that, in order to determine whether an uninformed agent becomes informed, we only need consider the incentives of agent n 1. Relative to the other informed agents, agent n 1 has the least to lose from diluting the information value (Lemma 2) but, being closest to the uninformed agents, the most to gain.
Taken together, Lemmas 1 and 3 imply the following.
Proposition 1 (Word of mouth) Under A1-A2, no equilibrium requires (direct) communication between indirect friends.
Here, communication endogenously occurs along direct ties. On one hand, it is a dominant choice for all agents to inform, …rst of all, their closest friend. On the other hand, the closest friend is most eager to inform an agent. This implies that communication between indirect friends is either unwanted or redundant and, moreover, that any agent i -when choosing whether to pass on the information -believes all and only agents i 0 < i to be (already) informed. As a result, we can restrict attention to equilibria in which information ‡ows only through direct ties.
Extent of communication Suppose the information has reached agent i. Agent
i might like to share the information with some uninformed friends, even though that dilutes its payo¤ from the information. At the same time, i will not want to share it with too many agents, since its payo¤ from the information vanishes in the limit as more agents become informed.
To derive i's preferences over who else should be informed, consider its utility when the number of informed agents reaches n > i:
From lim n!1 (n) = 0 (A1) and lim n!1 [1 + (i; n)] < 1 (A2), it follows that
This in turn implies the next result.
Lemma 4 For every agent i, there exists a unique …nite N i i such that
In words, N i denotes the maximum number of informed agents that i prefers to be included in I over withholding the information, that is, being the last informed agent. This is merely to say that agents'willingness to share information is limited.
For the next proposition, a weaker condition would su¢ ce; all we need is that some agent is unwilling to freely share information, lest the equilibrium be trivially that everyone becomes informed.
We are interested in how the number of informed agents, n, evolves as a function of the length of the chain, N . Let n(N ) denote this function. Our next result shows that n(N ) is non-monotonic.
Proposition 2 (Secrecy) Under A1-A3, there exists a unique …nite N > 2
Initially, information is always transmitted through the whole chain, and growth of the chain increases the number of informed agents one-to-one. However, when the chain reaches a certain length, the number of informed agents suddenly decreases; the information not only ceases to travel further but it travels less far than before.
The intuition is the same as in the example of Section 2. Although all agents i 2 f0; : : : ; N 3g would be willing to share the information with agent N 2, some of them do not want to share the information with agent N 1. They draw a line there because the friendship they feel for N 1 is not strong enough to compensate for the further erosion in information value. However, the information is not even transmitted to agent N 2, because the other agents know that N 2, who is closest to N 1, feels di¤erently, that is, would feel compelled to pass on the information. In fact, this implies that the information is not shared with those who would pass it on to N 2, nor with those who would pass it on to those who would pass it on to N 2, and so forth. In equilibrium, the information travels only to those who can contain its spread, or put di¤erently, keep it secret.
Proposition 2 tells us that an increase in the chain of friends above some size N 1 can erode the incentives to transmit the information. The next result shows that a further increase in the chain of friends can partly restore these incentives, though it does not make the incentives stronger than for N = N 1.
Proposition 3 (Trust) Under A1-A3, n(N ) oscillates between n(N ) and N 1 for N N .
As N increases over and above N , the incentives to transmit information are partly restored. The reason is that, as the chain of friends becomes even larger, more of the agents-especially those who would have passed on the information previously--become su¢ ciently concerned about secrecy to withhold the information. Hence, from the perspective of those who previously withheld the information, these agents become trustworthy again. As a result, they are (re-)admitted to the circle of trust.
But even as N becomes very large, the size of the circle of trust never exceeds N 1; it is intuitive that the group of con…dants must be bounded when secrecy is the key concern. It is noteworthy that the variation in n(N ) for N N is driven by changes in the trustworthiness of various agents rather than changes in their original preferences. Note also that, for the purposes of information transmission, increasing the chain length beyond N = N 1 is futile.
Information acquisition So far, we have assumed that agent 0 is endowed with information. For completeness, assume instead that agent 0 must acquire information at some …xed cost C. We are concerned with the situation in which agent 0 is not willing to incur this cost unless its can share the bene…ts with part of the community, namely its closest friends. (Otherwise, the information is always or never acquired.)
Proposition 4 (Innovation) Suppose that N 0 N i for all i > 0 and u 0 (1) < C u 0 (n) for some n. Under A1-A3, there exist a non-empty interval N ; N (1; N ) such that the information is acquired only if n(N ) 2 N ; N .
To sustain information acquisition, the degree of information sharing must strike a delicate balance. When information reaches but a few, the "community bene…ts"may be too small to motivate agent 0 to acquire information. At the same time, when information travels far, information acquisition may be undermined because agent 0 cannot control precisely to whom the information is transmitted.
The anticipation that the information either leaks out too far or cannot be shared out of secrecy discourages agent 0 from acquiring the information. The conclusion remains that some, but not too many, social ties are desirable.
Network formation and information ‡ow
The above results have a salient implication for strategic network formation: In order to garner information, individuals (must) build a personal network so as to draw sympathy and trust from those who are in the position to share information.
Abstracting from particulars, it is straightforward to see that this implication is generally robust whenever informed individuals are willing to share information only with friends but, even then, only a few of them.
A fully- ‡edged analysis of network formation that allows for general ( ) and ( ) is prohibitively cumbersome because there are too many parametric cases to consider. For instance, one fundamental layer of complexity would stem from the following question (and all of its permutations): How many friends with distance k would an individual want to con…de information to when n k 0 friends with distance k 0 2 Nn fkg are already informed? Yet, such complications are orthogonal to the basic insight that an individual receives information only through social ties and only if it can be trusted not to spread the information too much farther, which in turn can limit the number of social ties that the individual wishes to establish.
To explore this idea more simply, we digress from the (details of the) model in Nature confers either of two types of information on the selected originator.
With some probability, it is information that any individual is willing to share with any friend, irrespective of how far it travels; otherwise, it is partly rival information that an individual is not willing to share freely. We distill the spirit of the preceding analysis into a simple but e¤ective assumption: The selected originator is inclined to share rival information with at most (direct or indirect)
friends, where N =N o , whereas everyone else, upon receiving the information, wants to pass it on to at least one uninformed friend. Furthermore, we assume that individuals randomize between equally attractive information recipients, and that obtaining the partly rival information is everyone's overriding aim.
Networks form as follows. All individuals invite others, as many as they want, into a relationship, and invited individuals can accept or decline invitations. Forming a relationship imposes no (exogenous) costs. Thus, relationships form simultaneously and merely require bilateral consensus. We focus on Nash equilibrium (henceforth, equilibrium). In describing equilibrium outcomes, we restrict attention to social ties that serve the purpose of information sharing, thereby abstracting from such that are solely formed to internalize others' payo¤s without any material bene…t. 2 We call such outcomes, accordingly, information networks. It is noteworthy that, despite the absence of explicit formation costs, the star is the only equilibrium outcome. This manifests a simple but fundamental point:
The precedent objective of all imitators is to get access to partly rival information.
Since the originator prefers sharing information with closer friends (cf. Lemma 1), it is critical to be as close as possible to originators. Consequently, every imitator establishes a direct relationship with the originator.
In equilibrium, non-rival information reaches everyone, whereas partly rival information is shared only with randomly chosen imitators (see Figure 1 ). This is e¢ cient in the sense that no other network structure leads to more information Each imitator is connected to one originator, while originators form a line.
This result emphasizes the tension between access and trust. All else equal, imitators want to access the potential information ‡ow in other stars. However, they are constrained by the fact that, by establishing other relationships, they forfeit the trust of their current originators. In fact, imitators connected to several originators fall between stools. Thus, they refrain from entering into new alliances, not because of exogenous costs but to safeguard their trustworthiness; the lack of networking is a commitment device.
Originators have no such concerns; if anything, they gain better access to nonrival information by connecting to other stars. In the resulting network of linked stars, non-rival information reaches everyone, through originators acting as hubs, whereas partly rival information is shared only within stars (Figure 2 ). This is the sense in which each star embodies a circle of trust.
Many originators A peculiar feature of the information ‡ow in Figure 2 is that the originators never receive partly rival information from each other. This is because they are too well-connected; being at the center of a star actually harms them. This suggests that they prefer a di¤erent network structure, which requires more radical changes since the above network is pairwise stable. Indeed, a di¤erent information network emerges when individuals form social ties in the presence of several originators. nected originators, and some imitators are excluded. In either case, the networks are pairwise stable and contrained e¢ cient.
Originators …rst and foremost establish relationships with each other in order to ensure mutual exchange of partly rival information. Yet, in order to sustain trust, these complete subnetworks cannot comprise more than originators. For the same reason, originators may decline invitations from imitators, some of whom eventually remain excluded from the information ‡ow. Intuitively, the originators form circles of trust among themselves. As a result, information circulates exclusively in close-knit "small worlds"of well-informed agents (Figure 3) . Again, the lack of network structure is strategic and serves to uphold secrecy. Endogenous origination Last but not least, we consider a di¤erent situation in which, as in Galeotti and Goyal (2010) , all individuals are ex ante identical and information is costly to produce: Network formation proceeds as before, but any individual can now produce the partly rival information by incurring a cost C.
Crucially, in the spirit of Proposition 4, we assume that it is worthwhile to produce information only if it can be shared with at least one but at most friends.
Proposition 8 (Interlinked stars) Every pairwise stable information network with endogenous origination includes at least one but at most =2 N originators, and comprises interlinked stars: Every imitator is connected to all and only originators, while originators are not connected to each other.
In this setting, each imitator connects to all originators. As before, the intention is to improve access to information; tapping more originators increases the chances of becoming informed, since originators randomize among equally attrac-tive imitators. But unlike before, connections to multiple originators do no longer erode trust because all originators are informed. By the same token, originators need not connect to each other. Despite access to multiple originators, an imitator does not always become informed (Figure 4) . In fact, an imitator's probability of receiving partly rival information is bounded by =N and vanishes for N ! 1.
Due to the small chance of receiving information, individuals sometimes resort to producing information such that there can be more than one originator in equilibrium. Still, the number of originators is bounded by =2 in equilibrium because,
given that information is ultimately (expected to be) owned by individuals, it cannot be worthwhile for everyone to produce the information. Thus, the reason that not all choose to be originators is not that they expect to eventually get the information via communication. Rather, the dilution in information value renders autarkic information acquisition by everyone unpro…table.
Apart from resorting to origination, an imitator can, at least in principle, increase its chances of becoming informed by forming connections to other imitators.
That way, if the originator transmits information to the latter, the imitator can tap the information ‡ow indirectly. However, in equilibrium, such strategies must prove futile. Such information circulation among imitators undermines trust. If information were freely shared among imitators, originators would not share their information; in fact, they would not …nd it worthwhile to produce information.
To summarize, Propositions 5 to 8 derive information networks that, though distinct, all exhibit core-periphery structures. Intuitively, these structures emerge from a trade-o¤ between gaining access to information, on one hand, and ensuring trust and secrecy, on the other hand. This basic insight appears robust.
Property rights and social networks
Preferences over how far information should travel depend on how much the private payo¤s from owning the information are diluted as the information is shared with more agents. It is hence natural to ask whether the dilution can be mitigated for already informed agents who must be motivated to share their information.
By A1, the total payo¤ from information, n (n), is strictly increasing. One possibility is therefore to redistribute payo¤s among informed agents, for example, through monetary transfers. One could compensate existing informed agents whenever the information is passed on to the next uninformed agent. In particular, it is possible to keep every informed agent's net payo¤ constant, that is, just as high as when the agent …rst became informed. Consider the following transfers:
The total payo¤ is 2 (2), of which agent 0 gets (1) and agent 1 gets 2 (2) (1) > 0. n = 3: The total payo¤ is 3 (3), of which agent 0 gets (1), agent 1 gets 2 (2) (1), and agent 2 gets 3 (3) [2 (2) (1) + (1)] = 3 (3) 2 (2) > 0. n = 4: The total payo¤ is 4 (4), of which agent 0 gets (1), agent 1 gets 2 (2) (1), agent 2 gets 3 (3) 2 (2), and agent 3 gets 4 (4) 3 (3) > 0.
Etc.
Given such transfers, no informed agent ever objects to transmitting the information to more uninformed agents. In fact, each agent's utility strictly increases as more agents become informed. This becomes clear when we look at @u i (n)=@n in the case with transfers. Since the private cum-transfer payo¤ of all already informed agent remains constant at i (i), we get @u i (n)=@n = n (i; n) n (n) > 0.
We summarize this instance of the Coase Theorem as follows.
Proposition 9 Suppose each newly informed agent i pays fees to compensate existing informed agents for the decrease in their payo¤, (i + 1) (i). Then the information is always transmitted to all N agents, and larger N strictly improve incentives to acquire information.
Intellectual property rights are one interpretation of the above transfers. It is not surprising that such rights increase information di¤usion. Yet, Proposition 9 implies more than that: Better protection of intellectual property changes the impact of social ties on information transmission. Rather than being a threat to secrecy, large(r) social networks become a channel for word-of-mouth "marketing,"
thereby promoting information sharing and acquisition. Empirically, this suggests that better individual property rights over intellectual assets lead to the formation of larger networks, which in turn improve the collective use of information.
Concluding remarks
We have studied communication of partly rival information among individuals who are connected through altruistic ties. We show that larger social networks can reduce information sharing, which in turn imposes endogenous constraints on network formation. When forming social ties, individuals cluster into circles of trust, on one hand, to access information and, on the other hand, to ensure secrecy. Limits to personal networking, and thus the "missing links"in a network, are commitment devices to create trust.
A central departure from related work on communication in networks is our view of social ties not as merely providing access or utility but as relationships that involve incentive spillovers. The impact of a social network on information di¤usion is endogenous and operates through its impact on incentives. We believe this approach to social networks harbors promising avenues for future research.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 1
Consider agent i. Suppose i has the information and considers whether to pass it on to either agent i 0 or agent i 00 , where agent i 0 is s 0 steps away from agent i and agent i 00 is s 00 > s 0 steps away from agent i. Suppose that n agents, including i but excluding i 0 and i 00 , have the information. If i transmits the information only to i 0 , her utility is
where^ (i; N ) is i's community factor vis-a-vis every other agent except for i 0 and i 00 . Conversely, if i transmits the information only to i 00 , her utility is u i = (n + 1) + (s 00 ) (n + 1) +^ (i; N ) (n + 1).
Since (s 0 ) > (s 00 ), the expression in (9) is larger than the expression in (10).
Hence, if an informed agent can transmit the information to only one more agent, she informs the closest uninformed friend (or none). (Agent i may transmit information to both agents i + 1 and i + 2. The above implies that, if she chooses to transmit information to i + 2, she surely transmits information also to i + 1.)
Proof of Lemma 2
Using (7), we can write
and
Note that
Since 0 ( ) < 0, the di¤erences in the last expression are all positive for 0 i < n 1, which implies that (i; n) (n 1; n).
Proof of Lemma 3
Consider an uninformed agent i and suppose there are n informed agents. By
Lemma 1, we know that I = f0; 1; : : : ; n 1g. This implies that i > n 1 and, if i 0 denotes i's closest informed friend, that i 0 = n 1. Suppose that i 0 is s 0 steps away from i. Also, consider another informed agent i 00 , who is s 00 > s 0 steps away from i.
Suppose that only i 0 can inform i. If i 0 transmit the information, it utility is
where (i; n) is i 0 's community factor vis-à-vis the other informed agents, In fi; i 0 g.
If i
0 does not transmit the information, its utility is
Thus, it transmits the information to i (assuming that no one else does) if and only if
Now suppose instead that only i 00 can inform i. Using the same steps as above, it can be shown that i 00 transmits the information to i (assuming that no one else does) if and only if
where (i 00 ; n) is i 0 's community factor vis-à-vis the other informed agents, In fi; i 00 g.
We make the following observations. First, in both preceding inequalities, the right-hand and left-hand sides are positive. Second, the left-hand side of (14) is greater than the left-hand side of (15), as (s 0 ) > (s 00 ). Third, the right-hand side of (14) is smaller than the right-hand side of (15), as (i 0 ; n) < (i 00 ; n) by Lemma 2. Thus, (15) implies (14) but not vice versa. In other words, i 0 has a stronger incentive than i 00 to transmit information to i.
Proof of Proposition 2
For every N , consider the set fN i g i2f0;:::;N 1g . We know that N N 1 > N ; agent N 2 wants to inform agent N 1 (by A3). But this need not be true for the other informed agents, i < N 2. As long as min fN i g i2f0;:::;N 3g N , information is transmitted to everyone in the chain, that is, n(N ) = N . However, it follows from Lemma 4 that eventually min fN i g i2f0;:::;N 3g < N , as N grows further. Let N denote the smallest chain length at which this happens. Also,
fi 2 f0; : : : ; N 3g : N i < N g, the set of agents who would have information transmission rather stop with themselves than continue to N .
Then, at N , information only travels up to max M (N ). If the information were transmitted to anyone else, the information would be transmitted to everyone in the chain. Thus, n(N ) = max M (N ) + 1 N 3 + 1 < N 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
We continue from the proof of Proposition 2. For N = N , the set of agents who receive the information is a sequence f0; 1; : : : ; N 0 (N )g where
(The fact that it is an uninterrupted sequence follows from Proposition 1, or more precisely, Lemmas 1 and 3.) Accordingly, we have n(N ) = 1 + N 0 (N ). Now consider N N . From Lemma 4, it follows that the set of agents who do not want the information to travel to the end of the chain (weakly) increases in N . This implies that N 0 (N ) (weakly) increases with N . Since information is transmitted to at most N 0 (N ), we can think of N 0 (N ) as a virtual chain length (as opposed to the actual chain length N ). We can now repeat the arguments from the proof of Proposition 2, though using the virtual length N 0 (N ) instead of the actual length N . From this, it immediately follows that, n(N ) = N 0 (N ) for all N such that
At this point, we de…ne a new virtual length N 00 (N 0 (N )) and reiterate the arguments, etc.
Proof of Proposition 4
If N 0 N i for all i > 0, then 0 2 M (N ). By the de…nitions of M (N ) and N 0 , this implies that u 0 (N + 1) < u 0 (1), which in turn implies that u 0 (N + 1) < C.
Hence, if agent 0 expects the information to travel all the way to N , she will not acquire the information. By assumption, there exist some n > 1 such that
Proof of Proposition 5
Access to partly rival information requires a direct or indirect connection to the originator. The single originator has no incentives to decline an invitation. Taken together, this implies that everyone is somehow connected in equilibrium. For the purpose of this proof, let us refer to those that are directly connected to the originator as "friends," and those who are only indirectly connected to the originator as "friends of friends." We now establish that it is a strictly dominant strategy for every imitator to become a friend rather than a friend of friend.
Suppose that some imitator i is a friend of friend, only connected to the originator only through some friend i 0 6 = i. Recall that the originator prefers to circulate the information among its closest friends, and also that i 0 would share information with i (under the assumptions of the network formation game). So, if there are (more than) friends that are not connected to friends of friends, neither i 0 nor, by extension, i receive the information. Hence, i would rather (deviate to) become a friend. Alternatively, if there are fewer than friends that are not connected to friends of friends, the other friends may also receive the information with some probability smaller than 1. Again, i would rather (deviate to) become a friend because it would then receive the information with certainty.
Proof of Proposition 6
Consider N o separately formed stars, each with an originator at its core, who is selected by nature (to be endowed with information) with probability 1=N o . In principle, each imitator has incentives to connect to another originator, and hence another star, in order to receive information with a higher probability. However, under our assumptions, such an imitator would relay information received from one star to (the originator in) the other star. Hence, an imitator that connects to another originator forfeits the trust of both originators, each of whom would rather con…de in its other friends (of whom there are more than ). It is straightforward to see that originators can only gain from connecting to each other, since they can then share non-rival information while withholding partly rival information from each other. Thus, they will connect.
Proof of Proposition 7
Recall that the overriding objective of all individuals, imitators and originators alike, is to gain access to partly rival information. Originators obtain no informational bene…ts from connecting to imitators. Therefore, they …rst and foremost want to be friends with each other, thereby entering into a mutual information "insurance." If there are no more than originators, all of them connect to each other. The rationale for connecting directly to another originator is similar to that in Proposition 5; it is a (here, weakly) dominant strategy. If there are less than originators, there is scope for at least some, but not all, imitators to connect to this "core"of originators. Some imitators are excluded to ensure that, ultimately, only individuals share the information. For the same reason, if there are more than originators, the originators split up into several groups, each consisting of no more than individuals. This is because, if one such group would connect, and hence spread the information among, more than individuals, a selected originator in that group would rather withhold than share the information.
Proof of Proposition 8
First, there can be no pairwise stable equilibrium without origination. Suppose there are some invitations, and everyone expects others not to produce information. Then, at least one individual would …nd it optimal to decline all but one (or up to ) invitations and to produce information. Suppose there are no invitations, and everyone expects others not to produce information. Then, at least two individuals would …nd it optimal to create a relationship, with one of them producing information. Second, there can be no equilibrium with more than =2 originators.
Recall that information production is worthwhile only if it can be shared with at least one but at most friends. A fortiori, nor is it worthwhile if the information is owned by more than non-friends. If there are more than =2 originators, there is either at least one originator who does not share its information or more than individuals end up having the information. In either case, at least one originator would not …nd it worthwhile to produce the information. Third, originators do not need to connect to each other, since they need not obtain information from there can be an equilibrium with more than one originator. Let > 3. Suppose there are two originators; each shares its information with at least one imitator, and both together share information with imitators. Consider whether one of the originators would rather become an imitator. As an imitator, it would receive the information for free with probability 1=(N 1), since the remaining originator would randomize between all imitators. Clearly, originating the information and having it shared with imitators becomes more attractive (at some point) as N ! 1.
